Requiring a centralized service such as AS is inconsistent with the distributed structure of sensor networks. Moreover, sensors that are deployed near the AS will consume more energy to route messages for other sensors and will exhaust their batteries before others. Therefore, having a centralized AS will not scale well to a large sensor network.
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INTRODUCTION
OBJECTIVE
In recent years, security has become a primary concern to the communications between mobile nodes. Unlike wired networks, security in wireless networks is difficult to achieve due to the broadcast nature of internodes communications. In sensor and ad hoc networks, it is even easier for attackers to circumvent the underlying intrusion detection system because a malicious user can join the network at one point, hide inside the network for a while, and then mount attacks.
To protect the sensors from physical attacks, including physical tampering and manipulation of the sensor programs, we implemented a soft tamper-proofing scheme that verifies the integrity of the program in each sensor device in a distributed manner, called the Distributed Authentication of program integrity verification protocol (DAPP).
SCOPE OF THE PROJECT
Wireless Sensor Networks are becoming important for many emerging applications such as
Military Surveillance, earthquake, volcano emergency System. The security of sensor networks used for such application is of utmost importance
We implemented a distributed authentication protocol of PIVSs (DAPP) for sensors to securely communicate with PIVSs without the authentication server (AS) infrastructure assumed in PIV.
DAPP is a solution to the problem of authenticating PIVSs in a fully distributed manner and acts as the first line of defense for the network by enabling each sensor node to prove the identity of a server before communicating with it. The DAPP is to enable sensors to validate a PIVS before using it for their verification.
METHODOLOGY
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The methodology behind implementation of the DAPP is to verify the integrity of program in sensor by one of the PIVSs in the sensor network. All the PIVS broadcast the beacon message.
The PIVS with greater signal strength is chosen for the authentication process.
DEFINITIONS
1. Beacon message -The beacon message is broadcasted by the PIVS to the sensor and the reference PIVSs. Beacon message consists of id of the PIVS and the signal strength associated with it.
2. Nonce -It is a randomly generated number that is unpredictable and used to achieve freshness. It is also used to avoid outside attacks.
3. Authentication Ticket -The authentication ticket is granted by the reference PIVSs to the PIVS that is about to authenticate the sensor. The authentication ticket ensures that PIVS is secure and not compromised. 
CHALLENGES
The Challenges in implementing the protocol are
a) MAC Generation and Verification
We used HMAC-SHA for MAC generation and verification in DAPP. HMAC does not rely on encryption but instead uses a cryptographic hash function in combination with a secret key. Carman and colleagues analyzed the impact of security algorithms on energy consumption for sensor nodes, showing that the computation of HMAC-SHA for a 1024-bit message is energy-cost-effective for sensor networks.
b) Communication Cost
The communication overhead of DAPP is associated with a PIVS's authentication request to its neighbor PIVSs. For a PIVS to authenticate another PIVS, two messages need to be transmitted. First, a PIVS has to authenticate itself with N neighbor PIVSs to pass the authentication; then the neighbors reply. Therefore, there will be 2N messages transmitted to authenticate a PIVS. However, DAPP is used only before a sensor runs PIV and wants to authenticate a PIVS. Because a sensor runs the PIV protocol only infrequently, the communication overhead is not high. Also, because PIVSs have dual radio interfaces, the communications between PIVSs do not interfere with sensor communications.
OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT
We implement the PIV protocol in a distributed manner to protect the integrity of sensor programs. To remove the need for a centralized AS from the PIV infrastructure, we use PIVSs to perform the AS functions and Authenticate one another to achieve the distributed authentication of PIVSs.
PIVSs interact with one another to be authenticated without the need for a centralized AS in the network.
PIVSs need to share some secrets with one another to authenticate one another. Before deployment, PIVSs and sensors are loaded with functions to establish pair wise keys. After deployment, PIVSs and sensors can use the loaded functions to establish pair wise keys with any node in the network. In the original PIV design, protection of a sensor from a malicious server/code disguised as a PIVS/PIVC is achieved by using the AS that acts as a trusted third party. The AS can help a sensor ensure that the PIVS is authentic, and the PIVC it receives from the PIVS is thus safe to execute. Here, we propose a distributed protocol, DAPP, for sensors to authenticate PIVSs without using such a centralized AS.
DAPP has two more objectives in addition to the distribution of the AS function to PIVSs:
Reduce (1) the total number of sensor communication messages exchanged in the network and (2) the energy consumed by each sensor by using DAPP for authentication.
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OVERVIEW OF THE REPORT
The outline of the report is as follows.
Chapter 2 discusses about the literature survey Chapter 3 discusses the System Design Chapter 4 explains the Implementation Details.
Chapter 5 provides Tools Description
Chapter 6 explains Test Cases and Results.
Chapter 7 summarizes the report and presents directions for future work.
LITERATURE SURVEY
Program Integrity Verification (PIV) Protocol
In PIV protocol, the sensors rely on PIV Servers to verify the integrity of the sensor program. The sensors authenticate PIVSs with centralized and trusted third-party entities, such as Authentication Servers in the network.
The PIV [2] protocol verifies the integrity of the program and data stored in a sensor device. It is purely software-based protection from physical attacks in sensor networks. This protocol supports the tamper proofing of sensors and makes it difficult for attackers to modify the sensor programs without changing or adding the sensor hardware.
This protocol supports the tamper proofing of sensor program and makes it difficult for attackers to modify the sensor program without changing or adding the sensor hardware.
The PIV protocol performs three tasks:
(1) Authentication of each PIVS via the centralized AS;
(2) Transmission and execution of the PIV code [2] (3) Program verification by the PIVC and the PIVS.
Authentication Servers (AS)
Sensors authenticate PIVSs with a conventional Authentication Server (AS) [2] , to ensure that PIVSs are authentic and safe to communicate with and the sensors can safely execute the code received from PIVSs. 
Program Integrity Verification Servers (PIVSs)
The network is composed of sensors and PIV servers (PIVSs) 
PIV_DB
SYSTEM DESIGN
This chapter discusses the design methodology adopted to implement the DAPP. First the overall methodology adopted is explained followed by the detailed design of the components.
DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
 Hardware: A system with 512 MB RAM or above, with Intel Pentium IV processor  Tool: OMNET++ 4.0, Java 2 (Version 1.5 and above )  Operating System: Our system is platform independent.
OVERALL DESIGN
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
DAPP consists of three main Components:
Sensor.
Program Integrity Verification Server (PIVS).
Reference PIVS.
SENSOR
Each sensor in the network should verify their program using PIV servers which are deployed in the same network. The security of sensors is accomplished by authenticating PIVSs before communicating with them, to protect sensors from malicious or compromised PIV servers.
Sensors must first select a PIVS to verify its program. The selection is based on the signal strength received from the beacon message. The server with highest signal strength is selected for authentication. Reference PIVS will receive a PIVS Reference Message from the PIVS selected for authentication. Reference PIVS will check the authenticity of the message received. If the message is authentic, the Reference PIVS will generate the authentication ticket.
Reference PIVS will send the authentication ticket to PIVS which is then forwarded to the sensor whose program is to be verified. 
DETAILED DESIGN Figure Detailed Design of DAPP PROTOCOL
AuthTicket (B,MAC(KBE,NE))….,MAC(KAE,NE+1)
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List of Reference PIVS
SENSOR
Each sensor must verify its program periodically with the server. Sensor receives beacon message from the servers in the network. Beacon message contains ID of the server and the signal strength. Sensor then selects the server with highest signal strength to verify the program.
Sensor then creates an Authentication message which contains the ID of the sensor and the MAC value of the pair wise keys and Nonce. Forwards authentication ticket to sensor
REFERENCE PIVS
The purpose of Reference PIV servers is to prove the authenticity of the server selected to verify sensor's program. Reference PIVS will receive an PIVS Reference Message from the selected PIV server.
Reference PIVS then checks the authentication of the message received by checking the MAC values. If the message is authentic, then the reference PIVS generates an authentication ticket.
The created authentication ticket is then sent to the selected PIVS. PIVS receives a authentication ticket from the Reference PIVS. 
IMPLEMENTATION
This chapter discusses the detailed implementation of DAPP protocol. The steps involved in implementation and the classes used are explained in detail.
BROADCASTING BEACON SIGNAL
MESSAGE CREATION
Each PIV server must broadcast a beacon message to all the nodes in the network to share its Identity. PIV server creates a beacon message with following attributes  ID of server
 Signal strength
After creating beacon message structure create beacon message object and assign the value for signal strength and ID. The beacon message is then broadcasted to all nodes in the network using send ( ) function. The beacon message is broadcasted to all nodes in the network by creating a duplicate copy of the beacon message. The duplicate copy of the message is created using dup ( ) function.
IMPLEMENTED CLASSES
Class server ---invokes function for creating beacon message.
FUNCTIONS USED
beacon(" message name") --used to create object for beacon message and name for the message.
Send (cMessage object, type of gate, index) -used to send message to the particular server using gate index setSigstr (int value) -assigns the value of signal strength. The object for Authentication ticket is created and values for Nonce and MAC and the server ID is assigned to it. The pair wise keys are generated using ID of Reference PIVS and server. The MAC value is generated using the pair wise keys and the Nonce value. The authentication is then sent to the server selected for authentication. 
VIEWS
OUTLINE VIEW
The Outline View shows the structure of NED files in both graphical and text editing mode, and allows navigation as well.
5.3.2PROBLEMS VIEW
The Problems View presents errors, warnings and info messages in NED files, ini files and other source files in a unified manner. Double-clicking on an item opens the corresponding file and goes the error's location. The view's contents can be filtered in various ways (current file, current project, all projects, by severity, etc).
PROGRESS VIEW
The Progress View reports the status of simulation execution when you have a long-running simulation, or you are executing several runs in a batch. It is possible to cancel the whole batch operation with a single click if it is necessary. Simulation runs are running in different processes that do not block the IDE, so the user can keep working while her simulations are running in the background.
DEBUG VIEW
The Debug View is another one of Eclipse's standard Views, but it is not only useful for debugging. While the Progress View only shows currently executing processes, the Debug View displays the ones already terminated as well, together with their exit codes.
Processes are marked with the run number and launch time for easier identification. Doubleclicking an item reveals the process' output in the Console View.
CONSOLE VIEW
Each running process sends its output to a separate console buffer within the Console View, so the user can review the output after the simulation(s) have finished. One can switch between console buffers using the Console View's menu or toolbar, or by double-clicking on a process in the Debug View.
BUILDING THE PROJECT
Once we have created your source files and configured your project settings, you can build your executable. Before doing this, check if the active build configuration is correctly set for your project. Select Build Configurations | Set Active from the project context menu and choose which configuration should be built.
Once the correct configuration is active select Build Project from the Project menu or from the project context menu. This should start the build process. First a makefile will be created in each source folder (according to the project properties Makemake page) and then the primary makefile will be called to start the build process. You should switch to the console view to see the actual progress of the build. 
RUNNING OR DEBUGGING THE PROJECT
TEST CASES AND RESULTS
TEST ENVIRONMENT
• Front-End:
-.ned File(Network topology)
--C++
• Tools:
-Omnet++ (version 4.0)
• Operating System:
-Windows XP / VISTA
TEST CASE SPECIFICATION
Test Case 1
Selecting Server to authenticate
Use Case flow
Main Success Scenario and Alternate Flows
Objectives (Post conditions)
Verify that the server with maximum signal strength is selected.
Verify that the authentication message is sent to the selected server.
Preconditions
Input Expected Results
Test Case 2
Generating pair wise keys
Use Case flow
Main Success Scenario and Alternate Flows
Output: Authentication Ticket not received from all reference servers.
Result: Fail.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In PIV protocol, requiring a centralized service such as AS is inconsistent with the distributed structure of sensor networks. Moreover, sensors that are deployed near the AS will consume more energy to route messages for other sensors and will exhaust their batteries before others. Therefore, having a centralized AS will not scale well to a large sensor network.
Implementation of DAPP shows that DAPP reduces the sensors' communication traffic in the network and the energy consumption on each sensor by up to 85%, as compared to the case of using a centralized AS for authenticating PIVSs. The following charts shows the difference between the amount of energy consumed in PIV and DAPP protocol . 
Conclusion
The implementation of DAPP is to achieve the authentication of PIVSs in a distributed manner without requiring a dedicated and trusted authentication server (AS), an important departure from PIV.
DAPP maintains the distributed nature of sensor networks and reduces the sensor communication traffic in the network by more than 90% and the energy consumption on each sensor by up to 85%, compared to using a centralized trusted AS for authentication. We also show that DAPP is robust and secure against various attacks in sensor networks.
Future Enhancements
Future Enhancement of DAPP is to implement Intrusion Detection System (IDS). IDS for sensor networks is needed to initiate PIV on suspicious sensors after their initial admission and is needed to detect malicious PIVSs in the network. Once the IDS identify any malicious or malfunctioning sensors, it can collaborate with the PIV protocol to request the sensor to reverify with the PIVS. Once a malicious PIVS is detected in the network, other PIVSs can collaborate to revoke it.
